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Moral Psychology - Rules

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One Page - Answer the following questions based on the two attached articles. 


1.  What is the issue the author is concerned with and the main point the authors are trying to make about that issue? What are the reasons the authors give for thinking that this point is worth serious consideration?

2.  What do they agree or disagree about?

3.  Identify an example from the news, controversial issue, or personal experience that the reading(s) made you think about. How does it relate to the reading and/or illuminate the issues the reading raises?

4.  What do you find interesting or confusing about the reading(s)?

Category: Accounting & Finance Subjects: Behavioral Finance Deadline: 12 Hours Budget: $120 - $180 Pages: 2-3 Pages (Short Assignment)

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Race and Racial Cognition

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The Moral Psychology Handbook John M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group

Print publication date: 2010 Print ISBN-13: 9780199582143 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001

Race and Racial Cognition Daniel Kelly Edouard Machery (Contributor Webpage) Ron Mallon

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0014

Abstract and Keywords This chapter argues that current work on racial cognition is relevant to many of philosophers' concerns about race. It first examines several positions within the philosophy of race, pointing out where facts about the psychology of race could have an impact upon the feasibility of reform proposals offered by philosophers. It then reviews two relatively separate sets of psychological literature. The first shows that the content of racial thought is not a simple product of one's social environment, but is also shaped by the operation of certain evolved psychological mechanisms. After drawing out implications of this work for several types of proposals made by philosophers, it turns to the question of racial evaluation. Recent studies suggest that implicit racist biases can exist and influence behavior even in persons sincerely professing tolerant or even anti- racist views, and that implicit racial evaluations can be insulated in important ways from more explicitly held beliefs. The chapter then argues that these findings bear on the feasibility of proposals made in the philosophical literature on race, and may be useful in shaping novel proposals.

Keywords:   racism, eliminativism, conservationism, racial categorization, social reform, implicit attitudes, implicit association test, modern racism scale, prejudice, weapon bias

A core question of contemporary social morality concerns how we ought to handle racial categorization. By this we mean, for instance, classifying or thinking of a person as black, Korean, Latino, white, etc. While it is widely agreed that racial categorization played a crucial role in past racial oppression,

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there remains disagreement among philosophers and social theorists about the ideal role for racial categorization in future endeavors. At one extreme of this disagreement are short‐term eliminativists who want to do away with racial categorization relatively quickly (e.g. Appiah, 1995; D'Souza, 1996; Muir, 1993; Wasserstrom, 2001/1980; Webster, 1992; Zack, 1993, 2002), typically because they view it as mistaken and oppressive. At the opposite end of the spectrum, long‐term conservationists hold that racial identities and communities are beneficial, and that racial categorization—suitably reformed—is essential to fostering them (e.g. Outlaw, 1990, 1995, 1996). While extreme forms of conservationism have fewer proponents in academia than the most radical eliminativist positions, many theorists advocate more moderate positions. In between the two poles, there are many who believe that racial categorization is valuable (and perhaps necessary) given the continued existence of racial inequality and the lingering effects of past racism (e.g. Haslanger, 2000; Mills, 1998; Root, 2000; Shelby, 2002, 2005; Sundstrom, 2002; Taylor, 2004; Young, 1989). Such authors agree on the short‐term need for racial categorization in at least some domains, but they often differ with regard to its long‐term value. (p. 434)

Our purpose here is not to delve into the nuances of this debate, nor is it to weigh in on one side or the other. Rather, we want to explore the intersection of these normative proposals with recent empirical work on the psychology of racial cognition. Race theorists often trade in normative arguments for conservationist or eliminativist agendas, and these normative arguments typically involve evaluations of the costs and benefits attached to those agendas (e.g. Boxill, 1984; Appiah, 1995; Muir, 1993; D'Souza, 1996; Outlaw, 1990, 1995, 1996). For instance, these types of evaluations are present in Outlaw's discussions of the benefits of racial communities (1995), Appiah's (1996) weighing of the costs and benefits of racial identification, Sundstrom's (2002) insistence on the value of racial categorization in social science, and Taylor's (2004) exploration of the social and ethical dimensions of racial classification, which weighs the value of employing racial categories in different ways against the costs. Such evaluations invariably involve background assumptions regarding the feasibility of the proposals, and the ease with which racial categorization and racism can be eliminated or reformed.

Given how pervasive these appeals to feasibility are, one might expect discussions regarding the role of human psychology in constraining or facilitating various reform proposals. Instead, contemporary race theory is nearly devoid of effort to engage the burgeoning literature from social psychology and cognitive science on racial categorization and racial prejudice. This is unfortunate, for, as we show, the surprising psychological forces at work in racial cognition and related behavior often bear directly on the revisionist goals of conservationists and eliminativists. Our aim, then, is to demonstrate the

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need for normative racial philosophy to more closely engage the contemporary psychology of racial categorization and racial prejudice.

We begin Section 1 by examining several positions within the philosophy of race in more detail, in the process pointing out where hitherto unappreciated facts about the psychology of race could have an impact upon the feasibility of reform proposals offered by philosophers. In Sections 2 and 3, we review two relatively separate sets of psychological literature: one from evolutionary cognitive psychology and the other from social psychology. Section 2 focuses on recent research on racial categorization, and argues that a large body of evidence shows that the content of racial thought is not a simple product of one's social environment, but is also shaped by the operation of certain evolved psychological mechanisms. Moreover, we show that this research has substantial implications for assessing the feasibility of eliminativist and conservationist proposals.

In Section 3, we turn to the question of racial evaluation, and consider recent studies of divergences between implicit and explicit racial cognition. (p.435) This research program suggests that implicit racist biases can persist even in persons sincerely professing tolerant or even anti‐racist views, and that implicit racial evaluations can be insulated in important ways from more explicitly held beliefs. We then argue, once again, that these findings bear on the feasibility of proposals made in the philosophical literature on race, and may be used to help shape novel suggestions proposed in the conservationist spirit. We conclude that, although it has not received much discussion in the philosophy of race, the recent empirical work on racial cognition can have a direct impact upon the normative projects of race theory.

1. Race, Philosophy, and Psychological Research 1.1. Thick Racialism and the Ontological Consensus

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were marked by the widespread endorsement of biologically rooted racialist doctrines—doctrines that divided human beings into putatively natural categories.2 Such doctrines held that “natural” races exist, and that sorting people into racial groups on the basis of phenotypic features like skin color, hair type, and body morphology also served to sort them according to a range of other underlying properties that expressed themselves in a variety of physical, cultural, moral, and emotional differences among the various races. We shall call this view thick racialism. With the advent of modern genetics in the early twentieth century, it seemed obvious that the appropriate interpretation of such thick racialist claims was in terms of this emerging science of human heredity. In particular, it seemed that beliefs about the putative cultural, moral, and emotional differences between races would be vindicated by the discovery of specific and systematic genetic differences between races. However, subsequent research in biology, anthropology, social theory, as well as cognitive, social, and evolutionary

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psychology has brought about a consensus that thick racialism is false. The reasons for this ontological consensus that thick racialism is false are many, but an increased understanding of human genetic variation played an important role in undermining the supposition that there are genetic characteristics shared by all and only members of a race.3 (p.436)

At the same time, there remains substantial debate about what could be called thin racialism, i.e. the idea that racial categorization might be useful in identifying some important genetic differences or other biological properties— for example, properties that might be useful for epidemiology, medicine, and forensic science.4 Nevertheless, the important point for present purposes is that this ontological consensus against thick racialism is a point of agreement for all the authors we discuss below, and we shall take it for granted what follows.

1.2. Eliminativism, Conservationism, and Psychology

We shall call the normative philosophic position that recommends we do away with racial categories eliminativism. Eliminativists envisage a society in which there are no racial categorizations at all, typically because they believe that such categorizations are arbitrary and oppressive. For example, K. Anthony Appiah writes:

The truth is that there are no races: there is nothing in the world that can do all we ask “race” to do for us. The evil that is done is done by the concept and by easy—yet impossible—assumptions as to its application.– (1995: 75)

Here Appiah articulates both of the ideas central to many contemporary eliminativist positions: the first being that thick racialism is false; the second that continued use of racial classification is oppressive. In contrast, conservationism is the position that recommends we conserve racial categories, but do as much as we can to jettison their pernicious features. Conservationists are best understood as offering proposals for (at least short‐ term) rehabilitation of racial thinking, for conservationists typically advocate both the rejection of thick racialism and the eradication of racism, but hold that racial categories themselves should not be completely eliminated.5 Outlaw, for example, agrees that “the invidious, socially unnecessary, divisive forms and consequences of thought and practice associated with race ought to be eliminated to whatever extent possible” (1995: 86), but thinks that “the continued existence of discernible racial/ethnic communities of meaning is highly desirable even if, in the very next instant, racism and invidious ethnocentrism in every form and manifestation were to disappear forever” (ibid.: 98; italics in original). Conservationists like Outlaw appear to recommend a system composed of discernible racial groups, but one wherein those groups share equal social worth, as opposed to being hierarchically ranked. (p.437)

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Eliminativists and conservationists are best understood as revisionist: both suggest we reform current practices of racial categorization, but differ in whether it would be best to eliminate or rehabilitate them. Commitment to either type of reform, however, appears to entail commitment to substantive, if often tacit, psychological assumptions as well.

Consider first eliminativism. What exactly would eliminativists like to eliminate? Politically conservative eliminativists (e.g. D'Souza, 1996) are committed to the elimination of racial categorization in public policy. But many eliminativists (including a variety of liberal thinkers) have something much more sweeping in mind, and suggest reform extending from large‐scale features of social organization all the way to individual habits of thought and action. In such normative proposals the psychological assumptions of eliminativism are fairly close to the surface. Consider, for example, a classic paper in which Richard Wasserstrom writes:

A nonracist society would be one in which the race of an individual would be the functional equivalent of the eye color of individuals in our society today. In our society no basic political rights and obligations are determined on the basis of eye color. No important institutional benefits and burdens are connected with eye color. Indeed, except for the mildest sort of aesthetic preferences, a person would be thought odd who even made private, social decisions by taking eye color into account.–(2001, [1980]: 323)6

Clearly, Wasserstrom's ideal involves a substantial reordering not only of contemporary social policies, but also of the patterns of categorization underwriting even personal behaviors and thoughts. Given this goal and the assumptions involved, work on the psychology of racial categorization and racism is obviously relevant to assessing the ease with which (or the extent to which) such ideals can be realized. Moreover, if it turns out that certain ideals cannot be realized, that same psychological work will be useful in determining what sort of less‐than‐ideal goals are more attainable. With conservationism, the connections with psychology are more complicated, but it seems clear that conservationists, like Outlaw above, are typically committed to retaining racial categorization while eliminating racism and thick racialism.7 Indeed, to the extent that individuals or groups can reap the (supposed) benefits of racial identification and categorization while avoiding harmful and distorting implications of racism, conservationism enjoys considerable appeal. But is this division of racial categorization from racial evaluation (p.438) really, or even practically, possible? Here, too, there is strong reason to think information about human psychology is relevant to assessing conservationists' proposals.

Race and Racial Cognition

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In sum, both eliminativist and conservationist agendas include, often tacitly, goals of psychological reformation. In particular:

Eliminativists' Goal: Reducing the use of racial categories in thought and behavior. Conservationists' Goal: The retention of racial categorization together with a rejection of thick racialism and pernicious racial discrimination.

As we shall go on to show, the extent to which these psychological aims can be achieved depends on the particular facts of racial cognition. 1.3. Normative Proposals, Feasibility, and the Disregard of Psychology

Costs of normative proposals can be evaluated along various dimensions, including economic, legal, and social ones. Naomi Zack (1998: 16), for example, considers whether completing the project of racial eliminativism is politically feasible given the protection the First Amendment provides to even mistaken thoughts and speech. We'll continue talking about the costs in terms of a proposal's “feasibility”: the feasibility of a proposal is a function of the ease with which its goal can be reached. Neither “feasibility” nor “ease” is terribly precise, but we take the basic idea behind each to be clear enough to get our discussion going. Indeed, since we need some way to talk about different types of conditions that are relevant to assessing a proposal (economic, legal, social, psychological, etc.), insisting on greater precision would hinder the terms' usefulness.

One dimension that is rarely considered in these assessments is their psychological feasibility, the ease with which eliminativist and conservationist goals can be reached given the psychological facts about human racial cognition. This is puzzling. As we have seen, both eliminativist and conservationist proposals depend in substantial ways on our ability to reform our practices of racial categorization, and these in turn depend in part on the character of the psychology that underwrites these practices. Why, then, is there almost no engagement with the psychology of racial categorization by philosophers of race? The question is not one that can be simply answered by reference to disciplinary boundaries, for philosophical racial theorists typically engage research from a variety of sources, including history, sociology, and anthropology. Yet these same theorists make almost no (p.439) effort to engage with psychological research, despite its obvious prima facie relevance.8

Rather than speculate on what motivates this disregard of psychology, we instead devote our efforts to showing how recent findings about racial cognition are indeed relevant to assessing the feasibility of both eliminativism and conservationism. Realistically evaluating eliminativist and conservationist goals can be accomplished only if one takes into account some of the more robust and surprising results in current psychology. Below, we shall describe two such areas

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of research and illustrate how they make the disregard of psychology in the normative racial literature untenable. Along the way, we also draw out some more detailed conclusions about how specific psychological results affect the feasibility of competing normative proposals.

2. Racial Categorization and Evolutionary Psychology Both eliminativists and conservationists want to modify our practices of racial categorization: eliminativists by eliminating them, conservationists by doing away with thick racialism and mitigating the more unsavory evaluations that may accompany the use of racial categories. In this section, we shall review recent work in evolutionary cognitive psychology on racial categorization, and show how this work bears on the normative debates.

2.1. Racial Categorization and Specialized Cognitive Mechanisms

Racial categorization presents a puzzle for evolutionary‐minded psychologists and anthropologists (Hirschfeld, 1996; Gil‐White, 1999, 2001; Kurzban et al., 2001; for a critical review, see Machery and Faucher, 2005a). People classify themselves and others on the basis of physical, putatively racial properties, and seem to assume that these classifications group together people who share (p. 440) important biological properties (and perhaps also important psychological and moral properties). However, it is hard to account for this phenomenon with the explanatory resources favored by evolutionary psychologists, namely by appeal to something like a “race module”—an evolved cognitive system devoted to race and racial membership. First, it is difficult to identify a selection pressure that would have driven early humans to pay attention to physical properties now associated with race and putative racial differences, like skin color, body shape, etc. Long‐distance contacts were probably rare during most of the evolution of human cognition, and our ancestors would have had little direct contact with groups whose members had substantially different physical phenotypes from their own. Moreover, as pointed out in the first section, there is an ontological consensus among researchers from a variety of disciplines that whatever else they might be, racial categories do not systematically map onto any biological categories that support robust physical, social, psychological, and behavioral …

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Rules

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The Moral Psychology Handbook John M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group

Print publication date: 2010 Print ISBN-13: 9780199582143 Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2010 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.001.0001

Rules Ron Mallon Shaun Nichols

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199582143.003.0010

Abstract and Keywords Recent work on the emotions and moral judgment by Jonathan Haidt, James Blair, and Joshua Greene has done much to revive a sentimentalist tradition of thinking about moral psychology. This chapter discusses the proper interpretation of this work in light of another venerable tradition: the idea that moral judgment is driven by moral rules.

Keywords:   moral dilemmas, moral judgment, emotions, intuition, James Blair, Jonathan Haidt, Joshua Greene

Is it wrong to torture prisoners of war for fun? Is it wrong to yank on someone's hair with no provocation? Is it wrong to push an innocent person in front of a train in order to save five innocent people tied to the tracks? If you are like most people, you answered “yes” to each of these questions. A venerable account of human moral judgment, influential in both philosophy and psychology, holds that these judgments are underpinned by internally represented principles or rules and reasoning about whether particular cases fall under those rules. Recently, this view has come under sustained attack from multiple quarters, and now looks to be in danger of being discarded. In this chapter we consider this evidence, and find that it does not support the elimination of rules from moral psychology.

1. Moral Rules and Moral Reasoning Long traditions in religion, law, philosophy, and psychology connect moral judgment to moral rules. According to traditional rule‐based accounts of

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morality, an action is wrong if it violates a moral rule. According to “rule utilitarians” (e.g. Brandt, 1985), it is morally wrong to violate a rule that is justified by a balance of good consequence, while deontologists hold that there are rules—such as the prohibition against treating another person as a means to one's own end—that are wrong to violate whatever the consequences (Kant, 1785/1964; Ross, 1930). The central thread of these traditional approaches is prescriptive. For instance, deontologists maintain that murdering one innocent person to save two others really is wrong. It shouldn't be done. But for the purposes of this chapter, our interests are entirely on the proper descriptive characterization of moral judgments. And there is a closely related descriptive claim that is also suggested by traditional rule‐based accounts: the way a person actually comes to form a moral judgment depends on the person's application (p.298) of a rule. An action is judged to be morally impermissible if the action violates a moral rule that is embraced by the judge.

In addition to the rich philosophical tradition of rule‐based accounts of morality, there is a rich empirical tradition that adverts to rules as essential to certain normative judgments. In the literature on the moral/conventional distinction, it's widely agreed that at least for judgments of “conventional” violations (e.g. talking during class), these judgments depend on knowledge of local rules (see, e.g., Turiel et al., 1987). Thus there is reason to think that people make at least some normative judgments by drawing on their knowledge of rules. In addition, by appealing to agents' knowledge of local rules, we get an obvious explanation for cross‐cultural differences in normative judgments. For example, people in the US but not people in China would think it wrong not to tip servers in local restaurants. The obvious explanation for this difference is that people in the US embrace a rule about tipping (in the US) and people in China do not embrace that rule about tipping (in China). Thus there is independent reason to think that rules do play a role in at least some normative judgments.

Our aim here is not to defend the view that moral rules are the only factor in generating moral judgment, but rather to insist that moral rules are one crucial factor in the psychological processes that lead to moral judgments. In particular, we are defending an internal account of rules on which such rules are mentally represented and play a causal role in the production of judgment and behavior.1

Such rules come into play when they are thought to apply to a situation, i.e. when features of the situation instantiate properties that are represented in the rule, and one kind of rule we are concerned with represents properties traditionally considered to be of moral relevance (e.g. intention, injury). Consider, for example, the considerable evidence that judgments of moral responsibility for an act's consequences are sensitive to the intention with which the act was performed (e.g. Shultz et al., 1981; Shultz & Wright, 1985; Shultz et al., 1986). A plausible explanation for this sensitivity is that judgments of responsibility typically require the satisfaction of rules that specify the relevance of intention. And this is exactly the kind of explanation that is offered in detail in

Rules

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Figure 9.1. Rationalist model of moral judgment

“information‐processing” theories of moral cognition (see Darley & Shultz, 1990 for a review).

In arguing for the importance of moral rules, we follow influential traditions in both philosophy and psychology. In philosophy, much work on moral judgment can be seen as including an attempt to decide which properties and (p.299) principles we ordinarily think of as morally relevant. Similarly, the tradition of information‐processing approaches to moral psychology can be seen also as attempting to discern which properties and rules give rise to moral judgments and behaviors (again, see Darley & Shultz, 1990). Despite these influential traditions, moral rules have recently come to seem retrograde, a relic of best‐ discarded views of moral judgment.

2. Rules and Social Intuitions A recent and provocative challenge to a rule‐based approach to moral judgment is Jonathan Haidt's (2001) “social intuitionist” model. Haidt argues against a prominent role for moral reasoning in the production of moral judgment. Rather, he writes, “[Understanding of moral truths occurs] not by a process of ratiocination and reflection, but rather by a process more akin to perception, in which one ‘just sees without argument that they are and must be true’ (Harrison, 1967, p. 72)” (2001: 814). In place of processes of reasoning, Haidt argues that moral judgments are typically caused by moral intuitions (including moral emotions) that are “a kind of cognition” but “not a kind of reasoning” (ibid.).

Since all of the theories that are being considered are, effectively, causal models of moral judgment, it is useful to depict them with flow charts in which the boxes represent psychological mechanisms and the arrows represent causal relations. We might then depict a “rationalist” model as in Figure 9.1. This is the model that Haidt has in his sights.

In place of the rationalist model, Haidt offers a complex social intuitionist model, a crucial part of which we have illustrated in Figure 9.2.

Haidt marshals an impressive array of considerations to support his intuitionist model. Here, it might be helpful to focus on one sort of evidence that nicely

Rules

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Figure 9.2. Intuitionist model of moral judgment

(p.300) illustrates his position: cases of moral dumbfounding. Haidt and colleagues presented the following case to subjects:

Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if they tried making love. At the very least, it would be a new experience for each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them feel even closer to each other. What do you think about that? Was it okay for them to make love?–(2001: 814)

Haidt reports that subjects presented with such cases and asked for a moral judgment typically answer “immediately” that the action was “wrong,” and begin “searching for reasons” (ibid.). Only, these cases have been designed by Haidt and colleagues to undermine the most obvious reasons for a moral judgment (e.g. the risks and harms are eliminated, ex hypothesi). Thus many subjects find themselves unable to provide reasons that justify their judgment. When faced with this dumbfounding, do subjects give up? No. They simply insist that their judgment is correct in the absence of reasons. The conclusion Haidt draws from this and other evidence is that reasoning typically plays no role in the production of moral judgment. While Haidt allows that reasoning sometimes plays a role in moral judgment and behavior, he holds (contra the rationalist model) that most moral reasoning is post facto, not causing moral judgment but rather being deployed in the process of justifying one's moral responses to others—just as the subjects in the dumbfounding case search for reasons for their judgments. If this is so, then why do we think we know the reasons for our judgments? Our ignorance is readily explained by a host of experimental evidence (some of it reviewed in Nisbett and Wilson's seminal [1977]; see Wilson, 2002 and Stanovich, 2004 for more recent coverage) that (i) people are not consciously aware of the processes that connect their mental states to the causal effects of those states and (ii) people routinely confabulate explanations for their behavior.

Haidt is relying here on what are sometimes called “dual‐process” models of cognition (Chaiken & Trope, 1999), the fundamental idea of which is that cognition is subserved by two very different kinds of mechanisms. On the one hand, there are mechanisms characterized by conscious control, in which the “reasoner searches for relevant evidence, weighs evidence, coordinates evidence with theories, and reaches a decision” (Haidt, 2001: 818). Call these controlled processes. On the other, there are processes that operate “quickly, effortlessly,

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and automatically, such that the outcome but not the process is accessible to (p. 301) consciousness” (ibid.). Call these intuitive processes. Haidt's move is, then, to suggest (on the basis of a range of evidence) that most moral judgment results from this second kind of system, and so he concludes that it is not a kind of reasoning.

There is a variety of ways to question Haidt's account of moral judgment without relying on what Haidt (2001: 815) calls philosophers' “worship of reason.” Indeed, one of the best‐developed dual‐process literatures within social psychology—that of implicit social attitudes—looks to provide an empirical basis for doubting Haidt's view.

Consider the substantial literature documenting unconscious (implicit) racial attitudes. It is a hallmark of this literature that a person can, on various indirect measures (e.g. the “Implicit Association Test” or IAT), exhibit racial biases, while on explicit measures (like self‐report) that same individual is not racially prejudiced.2 In the most common version of the task, pictures of faces (black or white) are paired with positively or negatively valenced words in a sorting task. In such a test, subjects typically find it easier to perform the task when white faces are paired with good words and black faces with bad words than vice versa. And this effect occurs even when subjects appear to have explicit nonracist attitudes on paper‐and‐pencil questionnaires (e.g. Greenwald et al., 1998). The literature fits nicely within the dual‐process framework, with the automatic, implicit processes producing one set of outcomes while consciously controlled processes produce another. But which processes are “in charge”? On Haidt's model, what drives moral responses are, in the first place, implicit, intuitive processes, and the reasoning processes come along after the fact. Is that what goes in the literature on racial attitudes? We suggest not.

Instead, the literature seems to show that conscious controlled processes exert substantial control over explicit verbal responses and behavior, and that, as these processes become overtaxed or exhausted (e.g. by increasing cognitive load or by so‐called “ego depletion”), verbal responses and behavior come to align more and more closely with implicit attitudes. For example, Richeson and Shelton (2003) found that white subjects demonstrating an anti‐black/pro‐white IAT effect and then interacting with an African American confederate subsequently performed worse on tasks requiring effort and attention (i.e. a Stroop task).3 The suggestion is that interacting with the African American confederate required additional control resources (to suppress automatic anti‐ black responses), thereby depleting a resource that would be needed on (p.302) subsequent tasks. And Bartholow et al. (2006) show that alcohol consumption interferes with the capacity to intentionally regulate implicit biases, an effect they link to a compromise of control mechanisms.

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This is an important research program, and one that has revealed a startling array of implicit attitudes that may exert surprising effects on behavior. But the program does not show that intuitions run the show, only to be served by ex post facto reasoning. Rather, the correct model here seems quite a bit more like Plato's image of the soul as the charioteer (Phaedrus 246–254e) who must hold the reigns of the spirited horses (the automatic processes) closely so as to control them. When the charioteer becomes exhausted or drunk, the horses go wild, but that hardly shows that this is the typical case. Rather, it seems that where controlled processes maintain their integrity, connections between intuitions and behavior may be checked. At least the dual‐process research on racial cognition provides a substantial body of evidence that in an important domain of real‐world moral behavior, implicit racial bias processes are checked by controlled processes.4 We take these to provide substantial reason to doubt that Haidt's general model of moral judgment is correct.

Still, this is far from definitive. Perhaps racial cognition is the exception with respect to the role of controlled processes. Perhaps elsewhere in moral cognition, conscious control plays little role.5

In truth, no one has made any serious attempt to count moral judgments in ordinary life. Nor is it obvious how one might approach such a daunting task. It is therefore difficult to find evidence that would definitively answer the question of whether moral judgments are typically caused in a particular way.

But even if intuitions do predominate to the extent that Haidt thinks they do, it doesn't settle the question of whether moral rules or moral reasoning figure in the production of moral judgment. This is because the distinction Haidt (p.303) (following the dual‐process orientation) offers between conscious “reasoning” processes as opposed to automatically produced “moral intuitions” is simply the distinction between processes that are under direct conscious control, and those that are not.6 And this distinction cross‐cuts the category of inferential, rule‐ based processes that are at the core of the view we defend. To see this, consider that Haidt's case against the relevance of moral reasoning to moral judgment hangs largely on his characterization of reasoning processes as conscious or introspectively accessible. It is because, for example, the dumbfounded subjects seemingly employed no reflective reasoning to reach their moral judgments, and were unable to employ it to defend these judgments, that Haidt claims reasoning plays no role.

One might think that this is an odd way to characterize “reasoning” processes— indeed, Nisbett and Wilson's (1977) seminal work reports a variety of results involving complex cognitive processes—processes that are tempting to characterize as examples of reasoning—that seem to fail to be introspectible. For example, Storms and Nisbett (1970) experimented with insomniac subjects by placing them into three groups: arousal, relaxation, and control. Subjects in the

Rules

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first and second conditions were given placebo pills to take 15 minutes before bed on two consecutive nights, but the arousal condition subjects were told that the placebo would produce “rapid heart rate, breathing irregularities, bodily warmth, and alertness—symptoms, in other words, of insomnia” (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977: 237). In contrast, relaxation subjects were told just the opposite, that the pill would produce “lowered heart rate, breathing rate, body temperature, and a reduction in alertness” (ibid.: 238). According to the subjects' reports, arousal subjects got to sleep significantly faster and relaxation subjects took significantly longer to get to sleep (with no change in control subjects).

The explanation Storms and Nisbett offered for this effect was simply that arousal condition subjects reattributed their insomnia symptoms to action of the pill, while relaxation condition subjects assumed their arousal must be particularly intense since they still felt their symptoms despite having taken a pill that would relax them. Nisbett and Wilson (1977: 238) are particularly struck by the fact that in post‐experimental interviews, subjects “almost uniformly insisted that after taking the pills they had completely forgotten about them.” That is, although the resulting behavior appears to be the result of a process of reasoning involving the comparison of an introspective assessment of one's (p.304) arousal states with the an expected state, the subjects cannot recover this process of reasoning when asked later.

One explanation for this failure—the one that parallels Haidt's explanation of his dumbfounding subjects—is that the reasoning processes involved are subserved by automatic, unconscious processes.7 Suppose that is true. Then these processes would not be reasoning in Haidt's sense, even though they seem to involve complex inferences, determinations of relevant information, and other features characteristic of intelligent cognition. The right thing to conclude from this is that Haidt's use of “reasoning” excludes mental processes that may nonetheless be inferential, rule‐based, and highly “intelligent.” For example, Haidt's moral dumbfounding cases show nothing about whether moral rules or inferential processes were involved in the production of the moral judgments. They show only that whatever these processes are, they either (a) fail to be introspectively accessible shortly after completion or (b) fail to “deactivate” quickly in the face of countervailing evidence. Option (a) seems the right explanation of at least some of the classic data regarding failures of self‐ knowledge—for example, the Nisbett and Storms data reviewed above. There is good reason to think an inferential process is occurring, but for whatever reason (because it is implicit, or because it is not well encoded in memory) this process cannot be recovered in response to questioning soon after. Option (b) might also explain Haidt's dumbfounding results: after all, the subjects do produce reasons for their judgments, but these reasons are refuted by the experimenter. It's only

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after this process of refutation that the subjects are dumbfounded, but perhaps once the judgment is made it is not quickly abandoned.

Having said all this, we are now in a position to simply stipulate that moral rules may play an important causal role in inferences without that process being consciously accessible, and therefore without being “reasoning” in Haidt's sense. Because Haidt's attack on conscious reasoning leaves the door wide open to rational, rule‐governed inference at the unconscious level, his critique doesn't address whether moral rules play a role in moral judgment.

3. Rules and the Moral/Conventional Distinction A more direct challenge to the importance of moral rules comes from James Blair's (1995) explanation of performance on the moral/conventional task (e.g. (p.305) Nucci, 2001; Smetana, 1993; Turiel, 1983). Blair's work, like Haidt's, stresses the importance of relatively automatic mechanisms underlying moral responses. But while Haidt discusses the relatively broad class of what he calls intuitions (which includes moral emotions), Blair emphasizes the special importance of emotional response in moral judgment and behavior.

Blair offers a sophisticated account of the mechanisms underlying moral judgments in the moral conventional task. In order to appreciate this model, it will be useful to review features of the moral/conventional task. Previous researchers found that a wide range of …